UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/553
22 October 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 87 (b)

SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 46/176 of 19 December 1991, on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, the General Assembly, inter alia:

(a) Appealed to all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia, taking into account the statement on the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa made before the Second Committee of the General Assembly on 31 October 1991 by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonization and Trusteeship (see A/C.2/46/SR.26);

(b) Urged the concerned specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to resume on the most urgent basis their assistance programmes in their respective fields of competence in order to alleviate the suffering of all the affected population in accessible areas;

(c) Appealed to all parties concerned to terminate hostilities and to engage in a national reconciliation process which would lead to the re-establishment of peace, order and stability and also facilitate the relief and rehabilitation efforts;

(d) Called upon the Secretary-General to continue to mobilize international humanitarian assistance for Somalia;

(e) Requested the Secretary-General, in view of the critical situation prevailing in Somalia, to take all necessary measures for the implementation of the resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

II. BACKGROUND

2. Four years of civil war, against a backdrop of years of neglect and lack of investment in human development, basic services and infrastructure, have left Somalia in ruins. Major cities in northern Somalia have been reduced to rubble; houses, public buildings, communications and water systems have been destroyed and an already inadequate health sector has been rendered incapable of providing even the most rudimentary services. It is estimated that at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure has been destroyed, and 80 per cent of all social services have been rendered non-operational.

Agricultural production and Somalia's vital livestock trade have been crippled and an entire generation of Somali children is growing up without access to education.

3. In the 22 months that have passed since the overthrow of President Siad Barre, the situation in most parts of the country has continued to deteriorate. As foreseen early in 1992, almost 4.5 million people are threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease. Of these, at least 1.5 million lives are immediately at risk, and it is estimated that 300,000 people have already died since November 1991.

4. Throughout the period covered by the present report, there has been no functioning government in most parts of the country. Political instability is rife, and inter- and intra-clan violence abounds. The struggle for power has plunged towns and cities into a nightmare of insecurity, which in turn has hampered the delivery of vitally needed humanitarian assistance and increasingly threatens the well-being of relief workers.

5. Owing to a combination of deteriorating security and drought, some 700,000 Somalis have sought refuge in neighbouring countries and another 300,000 are exiled in Europe, North America, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and elsewhere. In Kenya alone, over 300,000 Somalis have taken refuge during the past 18 months.

6. Despite a situation which for most of the year has bordered on anarchy, a determined band of non-governmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintained a continuous presence, principally at Mogadishu and Hargeisa during these tumultuous times. United Nations agencies had officially evacuated the capital by September 1991. However, the Secretary-General gave UNICEF, which had been working in northern Somalia, an unprecedented dispensation to re-establish its presence in Mogadishu on 24 December 1991. WFP re-established its operations in the country in March of the following year.

7. The relief efforts of the non-governmental organizations, ICRC, WFP and UNICEF continued to be severely hampered throughout much of the year. Deliveries of humanitarian assistance were subject to extensive theft and looting, and relief workers laboured under extremely hazardous conditions. In the midst of this chaos, many hundreds of Somali doctors and a number of indigenous non-governmental organizations and local community groups also placed themselves at risk in their attempts to help people. Over the months, the fundamental breakdown in law and order has resulted in the deaths of many local and expatriate relief staff.

III. IMPACT OF THE CRISIS

8. The crisis affecting Somalia took its toll in different ways and at different times throughout the country.

Mogadishu

9. During the first half of the year, considerable attention was focused on the capital, Mogadishu, where factional fighting between interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), had resulted in the death or wounding of approximately 25,000 people. By March, over 500,000 people were reported to have virtually no access to basic services. Two months later this figure had increased to 700,000.

10. Although some food supplies had been brought into Mogadishu by traders, market prices were exorbitant and beyond the means of most of the population. Food distributions had stopped in November 1991 and, in January 1992, 7,000 metric tons of WFP food stored at the port of Mogadishu were looted. WFP attempted to deliver additional food in March, but the delivery had to be aborted following an attack on the WFP vessel on 4 March ouside Mogadishu port.

11. With a United Nations-brokered cease-fire in place in the capital by 3 March, opportunities to provide relief assistance gradually improved. In May, lengthy and difficult negotiations between the United Nations and representatives of both factions of USC culminated in a major breakthrough, with the reopening of the Mogadishu port for a WFP vessel. Though always fraught with hazards, the delivery of food and non-food relief by WFP, UNICEF and ICRC to north and south Mogadishu had eased to a significant extent by June. Nevertheless, the need to ensure a continuous flow of relief assistance into the city and its environs remains of prime importance.

Central region

12. The central region held a total of 500,000 displaced people by April 1992. Some 120,000 people who had fled Mogadishu were living in precarious conditions around the small coastal port of Merca, south of the capital. Delivery of relief food had been disrupted by Mogadishu-based armed gangs, although an indigenous non-governmental organization was able to assist about 1,300 vulnerable people on a regular basis. ICRC sought to provide for displaced populations in the area by deliveries brought to shore by small craft.

13. The area of Belet Uen, which lies between the riverine environment of the Shabelle River and the drier regions to the north, also rapidly became a centre for large numbers of displaced people. Belet Uen, the capital of Hiran region, became a catchment point for tens of thousands of people in search of relief assistance from Bakool, Bay and even distant Mogadishu. ICRC provided assistance through an extensive airlift operation, while non-governmental organizations undertook medical, supplementary feeding and mother and child health care programmes.

South-west Somalia

14. Gedo and Bay regions in the south-west served as a transit point for hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing into Kenya. These regions were also a major battleground between the forces of Mr. Siad Barre and General Aidid, and access for the provision of humanitarian assistance has proved extremely difficult. As greater access was gained to these regions towards the middle of the year, the full scope of the tragedy that was emerging because of the drought and civil conflict began to become apparent.

15. In the Bay region, Baidoa, one of the worst affected areas in terms of looting, also became one of the first symbols of the extensive human tragedy afflicting the rural populations of Somalia. Access to the area was often difficult, and relief airlifts became an essential means of delivery. UNICEF, WFP and a wide range of non-governmental organizations continue to expand their activities both in Baidoa and in the rural areas adjacent to the town. Similarly, Hoddur, in Gedo region, and Bardera in Middle Juba region, have become major centres for displaced populations in desperate search of food, basic medical assistance and shelter.

South-east Somalia

16. In Lower Juba region, Kismayo was one of the last Somali towns to suffer destruction in interfactional battles; it finally came under the control of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) on 15 May. The town's population is estimated to be 160,000, including displaced persons. In August, there were 40 camps containing 50,000 displaced people in total. The port is essential for deliveries of assistance to the hinterland but security in the port has frequently been uncertain.

17. The Lower Juba area has also witnessed the build-up of hundreds of thousands of displaced people close to the border of Kenya. This potential refugee influx has been of grave concern to the Government of Kenya and UNHCR, particularly in the light of the large numbers of Somalis who have already sought refuge in Kenya.

North-west Somalia

18. The north-west suffered heavily during the civil war in 1990. Its main city, Hargeisa, once home to over 500,000 people, was virtually abandoned by the population, most of whom fled to refugee camps in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Although many of them have now returned to the city, some 85 per cent of homes and public buildings were destroyed. Health care services, water systems, schools and sanitation, as well as communication and banking systems, were virtually wiped out throughout the region. In addition, hundreds of thousands of land-mines continue to pose a major risk to the lives of Somalis as well as relief workers.

19. Throughout most of 1991, the north-west remained relatively stable. However, continued stability was perceived by many to be dependent on a

large-scale infusion of rehabilitation assistance, particularly to meet essential infrastructural and institutional needs. Such assistance has not been forthcoming, despite frequent appeals, and the consequent lack of institutional and infrastructural recovery has been reflected in an upsurge of inter-clan rivalries, robbery and looting since the early months of 1992.

North-east Somalia

20. Although the security situation throughout most parts of the north-east has been relatively stable for much of the year, clashes between the controlling party, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and other groups have occurred periodically. With the assassination of a UNICEF staff member in January 1992 at Bossasso, it was deemed necessary to withdraw the United Nations presence. To date, there is no representative of an international organization in the region.

21. The port of Bossasso, however, remained active for commercial traffic, with off-take reportedly up to 20 trucks a day ferrying supplies to central Somalia, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and down to Mogadishu.

22. Much of the area experienced severe drought in 1991 and pasturelands were seriously depleted. This has had serious repercussions on an economy highly dependent upon livestock. Because of poor livestock health and lack of veterinary services, export markets have suffered greatly. In addition, many tens of thousands of displaced persons from Mogadishu and other areas in the south place a severe burden on the fragile economy of the north-east region.

IV. INITIATIVES TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

23. In March 1992, following a series of meetings in Mogadishu and New York, the United Nations successfully negotiated a cease-fire between the two factions of USC contesting Mogadishu. The cease-fire has held since then despite periodic breaches, making it possible for humanitarian assistance to reach both sides of the divided city. Access to the city was further enhanced when UNICEF, in the course of a dramatic rescue of a staff member trapped in crossfire, was able to move a convoy through the front lines between south and north Mogadishu. In May, the United Nations negotiated and established a vital route along the beach for convoys coming from the north to pick up food from the port. Now large numbers of people from both north and south Mogadishu cross the front lines daily using established corridors.

24. On 18 March 1992, the Secretary-General, conscious of the urgent need to coordinate all aspects of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, appointed a United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia.

25. The Security Council, by its resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, approved deployment of a 50-member observer force to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu; agreed in principle to the deployment of a 500-member security

force to protect relief goods and personnel; and endorsed a 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia proposed by a technical mission which had visited the country earlier in the month. These three elements were brought under the aegis of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in the country and assist in promoting peace and national reconciliation. The 50 military observers were deployed in July-August 1992 and the 500-member security force arrived at Mogadishu during the month of September.

26. To ensure that the distribution of relief assistance in the capital would not become embroiled in the continuing disputes between the two contending USC factions, the technical mission had obtained the agreement of both parties that a Joint Committee on Relief Assistance, under the supervision of the United Nations, would determine allocations from the port of Mogadishu. The Committee has since become instrumental in the apportioning, overseeing and monitoring of the relief operation, though there are growing concerns that it is becoming a hindrance to the rapid provision of assistance outside the capital.

27. A United Nations technical team visited Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992 to examine means of expanding the scope and effectiveness of UNOSOM. On the basis of the technical team's findings, the Secretary-General recommended in his report to the Security Council (S/24480 and Add.1):

(a) To increase substantially the airlift operations in which WFP, UNICEF and ICRC were already active;

(b) To establish a "preventive zone" on the Kenya-Somalia border for special deliveries of food and seed, in an attempt to reduce famine-induced population movements;

(c) To deploy four additional security units of up to 750 each in different parts of the country, subject to agreement by the concerned parties;

(d) To establish four UNOSOM zone headquarters, each headed by a civilian official, as the operational basis for a comprehensive approach to the Somalian problem. This approach would deal with humanitarian relief and recovery, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation in a consolidated framework.

28. The Security Council, by its resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, endorsed these proposals and called upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his efforts. The Council had earlier asserted, in its resolution 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, that, in the absence of the cooperation of the parties in the deployment of the United Nations security personnel, it did not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

29. As part of the overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs led a high-level inter-agency mission to Somalia between 10 and 12 September 1992. He was accompanied by the Executive Director of UNICEF and high-level officials of UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, FAO and WHO. The mission team met with various political leaders and clan elders, and with non-governmental organizations, ICRC and United Nations relief workers. A major outcome of the mission was the decision to develop a 100-day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, for the period until the end of 1992.

30. The 100-day Programme was drafted and refined through a collaborative process involving United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other relevant entities. It identifies the priority actions that must be taken before the end of 1992 in order to meet the most urgent humanitarian needs in Somalia. It also identifies the mechanisms required to implement the programme, the obstacles to be expected and ways in which they might be overcome.

31. The 100-day Programme was reviewed at the coordination meeting on humanitarian assistance for Somalia, held at Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992 under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia. The attendance at the meeting, reflecting the heightened international concern for Somalia, included over 350 representatives from 89 countries, 15 non-governmental organizations, ICRC, 5 intergovernmental organizations and 15 organizations and agencies of the United Nations system.

32. The priority actions of the 100-day Programme include eight main components:

(a) Massive infusion of food aid;

(b) Expansion of supplementary feeding;

(c) Provision of basic health services and a mass immunization campaign;

(d) Urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene;

(e) Provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes;

(f) Simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations;

(g) Prevention of further refugee outflows and displacements and initiation of returnee programmes;

(h) Promoting the rebuilding of civil society and local institutions, and economic and social recovery and rehabilitation.

33. Resources of up to $83 million are required for the implementation of the 100-day Programme. While virtually all major donors expressed strong support for the Programme, most indicated that they would need more time to review it and respond in detail. None the less, many countries demonstrated their solidarity with the plight of the Somali people by pledging a wide range of assistance. Some Governments offered additional aid support, while others pledged food, cash, supplementary food and medicines. Donors were encouraged to transform their pledges into actual contributions with all due speed, and to pay special attention to the non-food sectors, where donor response in most large relief efforts has traditionally been weaker.

34. During the Geneva meeting, there emerged a number of conclusions that bear on both the implementation of the 100-day Programme and the humanitarian efforts that will follow it.

35. All agreed that insecurity continues to create massive humanitarian needs and is the major obstacle to the provision of humanitarian aid. Strong support was voiced for the deployment of United Nations security personnel, as well as for the deployment of additional UNOSOM staff to carry out increased negotiations of security arrangements in sites where relief efforts are under way. The United Nations and others were encouraged to help build up and support local security elements under the aegis of credible local authorities and traditional leaders.

36. It was agreed at the meeting that the creation of peace and security in Somalia depends ultimately on the success of a process of national reconciliation. Continued United Nations efforts in this regard were strongly supported. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed the hope that a conference to discuss such political matters, attended by a wide range of Somali leaders, might be convened by the end of 1992.

37. Regarding logistics and delivery, the 100-day Programme calls for some 50,000 metric tons of food per month to be delivered and distributed in Somalia. From the United Nations side, while sufficient food has been pledged to meet this target, additional funds are needed for transport and distribution. Programmes will be undertaken to monetize food aid, especially higher value commodities, through sales to Somali merchants. Further attention will be given to providing United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations with the bulk fuel deliveries they need for their operations, for which the major problem is security.

38. Coordination of relief efforts remains an important concern. The Geneva meeting heard strong support for a clear division of responsibility among the respective United Nations agencies, under the overall direction of the office of the Special Representative. Efforts will be made by UNOSOM to improve such coordination in part by accelerating the fielding of staff, both at Mogadishu and in the four designated zones, especially to the office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance. Suggestions for improving the coordination of relief efforts based in Kenya will be examined closely.

39. It is abundantly clear that non-governmental organizations play a critical role in providing humanitarian aid to Somalia. Participants at the Geneva meeting urged UNOSOM and the United Nations agencies to enhance their support for non-governmental organizations activities through:

(a) Increased efforts for the protection of relief workers and supplies;

(b) Increased negotiations on behalf of non-governmental organizations with the various factions and political leaders regarding obstacles to relief delivery;

(c) Increased logistical support;

(d) Provision of funding and in-kind resources for non-governmental organizations implementing partners;

(e) Provision of a system-wide communications network.

40. While the 100-day Programme focuses primarily on immediate relief needs, many participants in the Geneva meeting stressed the importance of simultaneously undertaking rehabilitation efforts. This is especially true of parts of north-west, north-east and central Somalia, where such efforts are both needed and viable. Helping Somalis to rebuild their physical and human infrastructure, from water systems to schools, and providing key inputs in areas such as animal vaccination, will not only address humanitarian needs but also promote stability and eliminate the need for more relief efforts later. While it is difficult to predict the course of events into 1993, it is hoped that efforts after the end of the 100-day Programme can incorporate a larger rehabilitation component.

41. The implementation of the 100-day Programme, as well as the follow-on actions in 1993, will depend upon the full cooperation of all segments of Somali society. In this regard, the Special Representative proposed a follow-up conference to take place towards the end of November 1992 at Addis Ababa. This would be a conference of aid agencies, donors and concerned countries as well as relevant Somali groupings. Its objective would be to review the practical implementation arrangements with a view to ensuring that the 100-day Programme has the full support of all concerned.

42. Plans for humanitarian assistance to Somalia in 1993 will be reviewed in November and December as part of the overall review of needs encompassed in the revised appeal for the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa.

V. SUMMARY OF PROGRESS ACHIEVED

Food aid

43. The main providers of food aid are WFP and ICRC, which since June 1991 have been working in close cooperation in directing relief assistance to targeted areas. As at early September, ICRC had brought 83,000 tons of food into Somalia and was working on a pipeline of about 20,000 tons per month. WFP had brought 50,000 tons and pre-positioned another 30,000 tons, with 100,000 tons en route. Thenceforth WFP planned to move 33,000 tons into Somalia per month with coverage dependent on security. The combined WFP and ICRC targets would meet the food needs of 3 million people.

44. Bilaterally, the Governments of France and Saudi Arabia have sent ships bearing relief goods to Mogadishu port. CARE International, which is in charge of distributing WFP food supplies, provided 4,500 tons on its own account. In mid-August, the Government of the United States of America announced that it would provide 145,000 tons of foodstuffs. By September, 70,000 tons were already moving or had arrived for distribution through WFP, ICRC and Catholic Relief Services programmes. The United States military had also begun airlifting ICRC food stocks to southern Somalia and WFP food stocks to refugee sites in Kenya. Other donor Governments such as Canada, France and Germany were also contributing to the urgent airlift. WFP had airlifted over 780 tons to four different locations in Somalia and had initiated air-drops to the most remote areas.

Non-food assistance

45. In September, UNICEF had more than 40 staff members in Somalia, with offices at Mogadishu and seven other cities. It operated eight mother and child health centres and provided support to 27 other such centres, 7 hospitals, 30 village health posts and scores of camps for displaced persons. In July alone, 10,000 children under the age of five were vaccinated.

46. Since January 1992, UNICEF has been operating relief flights and has provided more than 800 tons of medical supplies, shelter material, supplementary food and water equipment.

47. WHO provides basic drugs and medical equipment to indigenous and international health agencies working in Somalia, at an average expenditure of $250,000 per month. It proposes to station four medical coordinators in the country, subject to adequate security arrangements. ICRC activities are focused on surgery for the war wounded and assistance to medical facilities. UNICEF, non-governmental organizations and bilateral agencies have started rehabilitation of water supply and sewer systems in a number of cities.

48. ICRC has distributed seeds and hand tools in farming regions. OXFAM and UNICEF have committed themselves to a joint programme of seeds and tool provision to up to 16,000 farming families in the Juba valley. FAO has four emergency projects aimed at rehabilitation of refugee farmers in north-western

Somalia. Livestock vaccination and veterinary assistance need urgent attention in the pastoral zones.

Assistance to refugees

49. UNHCR has decided to reopen its office at Hargeisa, initially with three international staff. The office will resume implementation of a multi-agency returnee programme in sectors such as water supply, sanitation, health services and education.

50. UNHCR will also play a major role in the preventive zone programme, involving cross-border deliveries of food and seed from Kenya to Somalia.

Rehabilitation and recovery

51. A UNDP consultant visited south and central Somalia in August to assess the conditions of displaced persons. His final report will recommend measures to prioritize ongoing relief activities as well as rehabilitation and recovery strategies to complement the humanitarian relief effort.

52. UNDP is also sponsoring a project to support Mogadishu's water supply and has contacted the International Civil Aviation organization (ICAO) concerning technical expertise to improve airport safety, management and administration.

VI. ASSISTANCE BY MEMBER STATES AND UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

53. In addition to the activities described above, several Member States and United Nations organizations have provided information on assistance rendered to Somalia in compliance with General Assembly resolution 46/176.

A. Member States*

Canada

54. As part of its response to the 1992 appeal for the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa, the Government of Canada provided, as at mid-May 1992, $Can 3,500,000 for food aid and a total of $Can 1,900,000 in non-food aid for Somalia. Food aid was provided through ICRC, whereas non-food aid consisted of contributions of $700,000 to UNICEF for health and nutrition support, $500,000 to WHO for restoration of health facilities and the control of communicable diseases, $200,000 to FAO to help control animal health deterioration, and $500,000 to UNHCR for the maintenance of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia and the repatriation and reintegration of 200,000 Somalis.

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* Responses reflect contributions received as at 15 October 1992. Future contributions will be included in an addendum to the present document.

Cyprus

55. Cyprus contributed $3,000 as humanitarian aid for Somalia.

Denmark

56. Denmark's contribution for emergency assistance to Somalia in 1991 amounted to DKr 2 million, of which 1 million has been channelled through the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) and 1 million through Danish non-governmental organizations.

France

57. France just shipped substantial food aid to Somalia on the vessel Le Briantais, which arrived in the port of Mogadishu on 4 August 1992. Its cargo consisted of food supplies (flour, oil and rice) and fuel: a total of 2,500 tons were delivered in this way, at a total cost of F 13 million.

58. Air links have also been used to ship food: the first C-130 arrived on 4 August at the airport of Baidoa carrying 20 tons of food on board. A second one landed on 8 August in that city with 20 tons of food and medical supplies. The overall cost for these two flights amounted to F 1 million. Regular civil aviation links are also being used: an Air France flight bound for Djibouti delivered medicine and blankets on 6 August.

59. For upcoming operations, there are plans to send a second vessel carrying approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of aid. There are also plans to increase the shipment of aid by air through civil aviation links with Djibouti. Lastly, medical and nutritional teams could be strengthened in order to "medicalize" humanitarian assistance.

Germany

60. In 1992 the Government of Germany will support two food aid projects in Somalia:

(a) The overall amount for the first project will be DM 4.7 million, comprising DM 3,860,000 for non-cereals and DM 840,000 for transportation costs;

(b) The overall amount for the second project will be DM 6.8 million, consisting of DM 4.8 million for cereals and DM 2 million for transportation costs. The country of purchase of the cereals (4,800 metric tons of rice) is Pakistan.

61. For technical cooperation projects DM 657,205,217 has been approved, of which DM 561,083,304 have been transferred until 30 June 1992.

62. Furthermore, the German Government made the following special contributions to multilateral organizations for humanitarian assistance to Somalia:

1991:	UNHCR	DM 1 million
	ICRC	DM 1 million
1992:	ICRC	DM 700,000

63. In addition, the following amounts were provided through German non-governmental organizations:

1991:	Somalia Society and others	DM 103,000
1992:	HELP (2,000 tent covers for Mogadishu)	DM 150,000

Ireland

64. The Government of Ireland has contributed to the efforts for humanitarian assistance to the population of Somalia in the form of cash grants to the following organizations:

1991	UNICEF: Emergency programme for mothers and children	£Ir 25,000
1992	UNICEF/WHO: Preventative care and supplementary feeding programmes for refugees and displaced persons (phase II of the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa)	£Ir 50,000
	Irish Red Cross Society: Emergency food and medical supplies	£Ir 25,000
	CONCERN: Essential medicines for supplementary feeding centres	£Ir 25,000
	GOAL: Essential drugs and medicines, Benadin Hospital, Mogadishu	£Ir 25,000

Japan

65. The Government of Japan has provided the following bilateral official development assistance to Somalia since December 1991:

(a) Food aid amounting to $1,226,880 disbursed through WFP and the International Emergency Food Reserve in January 1992;

(b) Grant aid of $600,000 (emergency relief assistance), extended through UNICEF in March 1992;

(c) Grant aid-in-kind (pharmaceuticals, blankets, tents and other materials) to Somalian refugees in Kenya in March 1992, valued at $136,434.

66. In addition, Japan provided the following assistance for the relief of Somalian refugees in neighbouring countries:

(a) A contribution of $298,619 for the general programme in Ethiopia and $149,309 for the general programme in Kenya, as part of a total contribution of $821,202 to the UNHCR general programme for African refugees made in March 1992;

(b) Food aid of $697 million to refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.

New Zealand

67. In the current financial year, the New Zealand Government has contributed $NZ 250,000 through non-governmental organizations for the relief of children in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia.

Norway

68. The assistance of Norway to Somalia totals so far NKr 26.7 million, or about US$ 4.2 million, broken down as follows:

UNICEF: 100 tons of BP-5 biscuits (NKr 2,623,400)	$409,906
Norwegian Church Aid: 36 tons of BP-5 biscuits, emergency stocks (NKr 911,910)	$142,486
UNHCR: 8 Rubbhalls for an airlift of Somali refugees in Kenya (NKr 1,270,000)	$198,438
UNHCR: 8 Rubbhalls for the emergency programme in Kenya for, inter alia, Somali refugees (NKr 1,040,000)	$162,500

UNHCR: One field hospital (NORSHOP) unit for Mogadishu (NKr 2,325,790)	$363,405
Norwegian Red Cross/ICRC, cash contribution for relief operations in Mogadishu and Berbera (NKr 6,000,000)	$937,500
Norwegian Church Aid: 4 Rubbhalls, emergency stocks (NKr 520,000)	$81,250
Norwegian Peoples Aid: Mine-clearing project in northern Somalia (NKr 8,000,000)	$1,250,000
Norwegian Red Cross/ICRC: Emergency relief aid, medical and technical personnel (NKr 4,000,000)	$625,000

Pakistan

69. The Government of Pakistan has contributed US$ 25,000 to the United Nations humanitarian relief programme in Somalia.

Saudi Arabia

70. The Government of Saudi Arabia has donated $10 million in food items for those affected in Somalia. The first batch of this aid, around 4,300 tons of nutritional food (about 175,000 cartons, containing small boxes, each of which holds 10 kg of rice, 5 kg of sugar, 5 kg of flour, 3 litres of corn oil and a box of powdered milk of 1,800 grams) has been transported to the United Nations operation for the needy in Somalia. It is estimated that around 215,000 persons are benefiting from it. At the same time preparations are being made to send 1,700 tons of the second batch (around 60,000 packages).

Sweden

71. During fiscal year 1990/91 Somalia has received SKr 22.1 million of disaster relief assistance from the Government of Sweden. In fiscal year 1991/92, SKr 1.2 million was allocated to the Under-Secretary-General's mission. Additional assistance to Somalia has been given through the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa and other regional appeals. Since November 1991, SKr 186 million has been transferred to that Programme, as shown below:

UNHCR	SKr 33 million
WFP	SKr 65 million
UNICEF	SKr 45 million
FAO	SKr 12 million
WHO	SKr 4 million
UNV	SKr 1 million

The non-governmental organization Lutherhjälpen and Médecins sans Frontières have received SKr 23 million and 3 million, respectively, for operative assistance within the Special Emergency Programme. The ICRC regional appeal for Africa received SKr 46 million in 1991 and approximately 80 million for 1992. The UNHCR appeal for Africa received SKr 70 million in 1992. Large portions of these amounts are reserved for the Horn of Africa.

B. United Nations organizations

United Nations Children's Fund

72. Since December 1991, UNICEF has maintained a permanent presence in Mogadishu and re-established activities in various other parts of Somalia. In northern Somalia, several mother and child health centres had been reactivated and limited water resources and educational facilities restored. The murder of Dr. Marta Pumpalova in January 1992 forced the suspension of operations in the north-east as the security situation deteriorated. Despite the precarious working conditions, UNICEF continues to have the largest contingent of international staff of any United Nations agency on the ground in Somalia. The cease-fire in Mogadishu has made possible the distribution of emergency medical supplies and equipment to indigenous non-governmental organizations and other partners UNICEF has been working with. The 90-day Plan of Action is in effect and will be completed at the end of July. During the month of June the number of airlifts increased immensely, with over 300 tons of supplies delivered. UNICEF has recently expanded its operations to Kismayo and Baidoa.

United Nations Development Programme

73. Insecurity in the capital and throughout most of the country forced UNDP to suspend its development activities in 1992. UNDP has continued to operate its Emergency Unit in support of the work of the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia and is exploring ways in which it may help provide limited rehabilitation assistance in parts of the country that may be accessible. In this context it is providing air transportation and telecommunications service to the United Nations and non-governmental organization staff working in Somalia, and is cooperating with the European Economic Community, the United States Agency for International Development and UNICEF in the rehabilitation of the water supply system of Mogadishu.

United Nations Environment Programme

74. Prior to the escalation of the civil war, UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank had initiated efforts for the preparation of a national environmental action plan. This initiative will be intensified as soon as the situation makes it possible.

75. Somalia benefited from the various forms of assistance provided by UNEP to the Eastern Africa Subregional Environment Group, which is a grouping of the national directors of the environment in the eastern African subregion. Through the Group, subregional cooperation concerning the environment is being promoted. It also serves as a forum for assessing national environmental problems, actions being taken by individual Governments and for considering strategies for dealing with common environmental problems in eastern Africa.

76. Similar benefits derive from the cooperative activities of UNEP and the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development, which are largely in the area of desertification control in Somalia.

World Food Programme

77. Under the 90-day Plan of Action, WFP and ICRC are complementing each other's actions in order to obtain a food assistance coverage as complete as possible. WFP is concentrating its efforts on Mogadishu and the northern parts of Somalia using Mogadishu port and exploring the capacities of the ports of Zeila, Mait, Laskorey and Bossasso. ICRC is mainly aiming at addressing the needs in the southern parts and in the rural areas of the country from 18 different entry points.

78. The distribution modalities vary from free food distribution to offshore market sales schemes, depending on the regional particularities and the security conditions. In Mogadishu particularly, distribution has not been risk-free and monitoring has been difficult because of the proliferation of arms in the city. Deliveries of high value commodities have also increased insecurity.

79. WFP will provide 68,756 tons of food commodities at a total cost of about US$ 19 million. To date, 93 per cent of the requirements have been resourced. The food commodities are targeted to some 1.8 million persons who are located in Mogadishu and the north-west and north-east regions of Somalia.

80. WFP initiated air operations from Nairobi to Mogadishu in which some 258 tons of essential supplies such as UNIMIX, drugs and shelter materials were delivered to UNICEF between 26 February and 8 March 1992, utilizing Ilyushin-76 aircraft. The air operations have continued and to date 352 tons of essential supplies have been delivered to UNICEF from Nairobi, utilizing Antonov-12 aircraft.

81. In March 1992, WFP made a first attempt to enter the port of Mogadishu. The boat was shelled and had to return to Mombasa without being able to unload.

82. On 3 May 1992, the WFP chartered ship Felix arrived in Mogadishu port with 5,000 metric tons of relief wheat, enough to feed 1,270,000 persons in 15 districts for 10 days. The ship was the first to enter the port since 17 November 1991. This came about as the result of long, delicate and difficult negotiations which the United Nations conducted with the two parties through the Joint Committee for Relief Assistance.

83. On 5 May 1992 the delivery of food from the port to distribution centres around the divided city was initiated. Through the singular effort of WFP, joint food convoys involving trucks from opposing factions were able to deliver food to three districts in Mogadishu which straddle the frontlines, without incident. The operation has been considered to be a major success for the United Nations emergency programme in Mogadishu. The breakthrough allowed the first commercial food shipment to dock in Mogadishu on 19 May. ICRC ships are now also able to use Mogadishu's port facilities.

84. The arrival of the relief food was accompanied by a significant decrease in the prices of essential food items in Mogadishu markets. Preparatory work has started for the arrival at Mogadishu of the next consignment of 7,000 tons of wheat from Djibouti.

85. As regards northern Somalia, four critical areas will be addressed, namely, assistance to highly vulnerable groups, with emphasis on the displaced; assistance for promoting demobilization; community-based assistance to returnee-impacted areas; and emergency income-generation activities. Offshore market sales schemes administered by CARE International will provide the resources for the rehabilitation of the social services infrastructure. These programmes will be initiated once security arrangements are in place and the design of the modalities completed. Leaders in both north-west and north-east Somalia fully endorse the offshore sales mechanism.

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)

86. Since the beginning of 1991, Habitat has been actively consulting with the Somalia field office of UNDP, temporarily stationed at Nairobi, regarding the participation of the Centre in an inter-agency needs assessment mission to Somalia on specific areas, including basic infrastructure; upgrading, rehabilitation and improvement of shelter and other structures; institutional and municipal support; organization and management; training and capacity building; and environmental issues such as water supply and solid waste management.

87. In view of the breakdown in administration and the resulting volatile situation in Somalia the mission has been postponed.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

88. The FAO assessment of the food supply situation in Somalia was included in the consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Horn of Africa issued on 1 February 1992. The FAO Global Information and Early Warning System continues to monitor the food supply situation from a special office at Nairobi; direct in-country monitoring will be resumed when conditions permit the re-opening of the FAO office at Mogadishu.

89. Under the FAO technical cooperation programme project on assistance to the food security programme, phase I, a workshop was held at FAO headquarters for two weeks in February 1992 to discuss the various problems related to the food security situation in Somalia. This will be followed by another workshop in the country when the security situation improves.

90. Under the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa, FAO has identified two project proposals in the field of agriculture and livestock rehabilitation for donor consideration. The proposals relate to (a) urgent provision of seeds and hand tools to restore agricultural productivity among the small-scale farmers of Somalia and (b) urgent provision of mobile polyclinics to arrest health deterioration in Somalia.

91. In the meantime, FAO has identified and is currently financing modest emergency projects involving provision of vegetable seeds, pesticides, farm tools and veterinary drugs and supplies to small holders and livestock herders as follows: (a) emergency supply of pesticides for vegetable crop protection; (b) emergency provision of seeds and hand tools to small holders in irrigated areas of north-west Somalia; (c) emergency assistance to control trypanosomiasis in Badhade district; (d) emergency disposal of old pesticides; and (e) emergency supply of veterinary drugs and supplies to northern Somalia.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

92. Since the ousting of the former regime in early 1991, UNHCR has no presence in southern Somalia following the evacuation for the second time of all United Nations staff from Mogadishu in April 1991. Since then, UNHCR has concentrated on resuming its presence and operations in north-west Somalia in anticipation of a mass voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from neighbouring Ethiopia.

93. Some 100,000 individuals were reported to have returned to the areas surrounding Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera. UNHCR re-established its office at Hargeisa in November 1991 to prepare for the returnee programme but the deteriorating security situation in north-west Somalia in April 1992 forced it temporarily to suspend its operations. In spite of the precarious security situation, preparations for the provision of relief items in the form of a one-time returnee package, comprising blankets, plastic sheeting for roofs, basic construction tools and water containers, continued during the period April 1991 to April 1992. UNHCR was also giving assistance in Hargeisa to some 450 military and civilian asylum-seekers from Ethiopia. The promotion of voluntary repatriation by UNHCR will depend on the evolution of the situation in Somalia and Ethiopia.

94. In addition to the provision of the one-time package to returnees, the UNHCR plan includes community-based projects for the rehabilitation of existing health, water, agriculture and education infrastructure. UNHCR has also contributed some $3 million to the mine-clearing operation in north-west Somalia in 1991 and 1992.

95. UNHCR is in the process of reviewing the present security situation in Somalia in close consultation with other concerned United Nations agencies and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat in the hope of resuming its presence and implementing its planned returnee programme in north-west Somalia. UNHCR is fully committed to the implementation of the returnee/reintegration programme and it is for this that UNHCR and CARE International teams are in Djibouti awaiting security clearance to return to north-west Somalia.

World Health Organization

96. In 1991, WHO maintained its assistance to Somalia in spite of the withdrawal of its team of experts from the country by maintaining the team functioning in Nairobi and visiting the country whenever the situation permitted. Total WHO assistance amounted to US$ 2,513,000 from its regular budget, over $1 million of this sum being spent on the purchase of emergency supplies and medicines for dealing with the ongoing emergency in the country.

97. In the first five months of 1992, WHO allocation from its regular budget fund totalled $1,244,000. In addition, WHO obligated a total of $558,000 received from donors after the launching of a consolidated appeal under the auspices of the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa.

98. While this assistance has been instrumental in improving the health standards of the population affected by this emergency, it is not sufficient to meet the massive needs of the country.